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30 Years after 
TVA and the Snail
Darter Clashed,
the Case Still
Echoes in Caselaw,
Politics and
Popular Culture
COVER STORY
It is perhaps the most dramatic national legal story to come out of
Tennessee in the past 75 years — the controversy called Hiram Hill,
et al. v. Tennessee Valley Authority — the little endangered snail
darter fish versus TVA’s Tellico Dam.1 Developing over the course of
most of a decade, the Tennessee lawsuit became a cultural icon,
famous or infamous around the world. 
Thirty years later the case still reverberates today in caselaw,
politics, and as an ironic reference in popular culture.2 Here is the
iconic caricature of the case that most readers, if they’ve heard of the
snail darter, will probably have internalized:
A two-inch endangered minnow, pulled out of a hat at the last
possible moment — and the federal Endangered Species Act —
were misused by extremist environmentalists to block completion
of an economically beneficial $150 million TVA hydroelectric dam.
By Zygmunt J. B. Plater
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TINY FISH
BIG BATTLE
It turns out that every single element
of that caricature is inaccurate.3 The
force of the caricature, however, carried
far beyond Tennessee to affect major
political and policy battles at the
national level. The Tellico Dam case
traveled north to become a chess piece
on the national political chessboard,
around which major political forces
swirled and clashed, with continuing
consequences today.
The University of Tennessee College
of Law’s 30-year darter-versus-dam
symposium offers a beneficial
opportunity finally to put the case into
an academic forum and accurate
perspective, free of the spins, disinfor-
mation, and politicking that graced its
years of notoriety, 1973-1980. [UT
College of Law’s “Symposium on TVA v.
Hill: a 30-Year Retrospective on the
Legendary Snail Darter Case,” is April 18,
exactly 30 years after the U.S. Supreme
Court arguments. See more information
about the symposium on page 21 and at
http://www.law.utk.edu/news/08snail.htm.]
Although it is still perhaps lingeringly
controversial in the Valley to confront
the facts that are revealed on the
objective public record, 30 years later
the elements of the controversy have
become broadly clear. Though your
author was a committed citizen
advocate, privileged to represent the
darter and its allies throughout those
years of the case, the full merits now
can and should be addressed objectively
in the academic forum, and lessons
drawn. The case’s merits, however, are
radical enough in objective historical
perspective to make any accurate
analysis quite one-sided.
The Case’s Merits 
It Wasn’t Really a Hydro Project. TVA’s
Tellico Project was situated on the last
undammed part of the
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A Snail Darter Timeline
1936: TVA lists Tellico site on Little Tennessee River (at confluence with
Watts Bar and Ft. Loudoun reservoirs on Big Tennessee), as one
of 69 potential dam sites. 
1940-67: TVA builds more than 5 dozen dams
1959: TVA Chair Red Wagner posits a Tellico Dam to be primarily justified by
land development and recreation benefit claims.
1968: TVA begins Tellico Dam, based on land development for “Timberlake
New Town” to be built by Boeing Corp.; concrete dam built, 
$4 million.
1972: Farmers and environmentalists get NEPA injunction, based on TVA’s
lack of EIS.
1973: New EIS deemed sufficient—NEPA injunction lifted.
Aug. 12: Dr. David Etnier discovers snail darter at Coytee Springs
shoal on Little T.
Dec. 28: Richard Nixon signs Endangered Species Act [ESA]
1975: Boeing abandons Timberlake project, citing economic impracticality.
Citizens’ petition to federal Department of Interior granted for
listing of snail darter as endangered, critical habitat, 
under ESA §7.
1976: District Judge Robert Taylor finds facts of ESA §7 violation, declines
injunction.
1977: Sixth Circuit grants injunction.
1978: April 18: Oral argument in Supreme Court. 
June 15: Supreme Court upholds injunction. 
1979: Jan. 29: Cabinet-level God Committee, created by Baker-Culver
ESA Amendments, unanimously upholds snail darter injunction on
economic grounds.
July-Sept.: Sen. Baker and Rep. John Duncan push appropriations
rider over-ruling ESA and other laws. Pres. Jimmy Carter fails to
veto override. Cherokees file religious freedom lawsuit; Judge
Taylor dismisses lawsuit; 6th Cir. affirms; S.Ct. denies cert.
Nov. 29: Reservoir completed and river impounded.
1982: No economic activity; TVA proposes use of valley as regional toxic
waste facility; citizens’ public outcry sinks proposal.
1984: TVA begins cooperation with Walmart-linked developers to create
high-income resort home development.
1984ff: Some light industrial development locates near Highway 411;
extensive flatwater recreation around lake; several communities
of high-income resort homes; darter transplants allow downlisting
of the darter to “threatened” status.
Continued on page 16 Snail darter illustrations by Dolores Roberson
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Little Tennessee River, 33 miles of
flowing river ending at Fort Loudoun
Dam, Fort Loudoun Reservoir, and
Watts Bar Reservoir, the last such high-
quality stretch of big river left,
surrounded by 24 dams within 50
miles. From its beginning in 1959
Tellico was designed and justified by
TVA to carry an unusual array of novel
economic development claims. As the
marginal last of 69
buildable damsites, it
could not be justified
for normal hydro-
project purposes — for
electric power
generation, flood
control, barge traffic,
etc. — so TVA’s
leadership focused
Tellico on recreation
and land development
benefits. 
An essential part of
the agency’s justification for Tellico was
to condemn more than 300 private
family farms — more than three times as
much land as was needed for a reservoir,
most of the farms untouched by the
impoundment — and resell the land to
private developers, in a sense anticipating
the 2006 Kelo v. New London controversy.
By hypothesizing a Model City to be
called “Timberlake New Town” to be
built by the Boeing Corp. with close to
$1 billion in hoped-for taxpayer
subsidies, the agency was able to project
substantial “shoreland development”
benefits in its official benefit-cost justifi-
cation, and by manipulating economic
projections could estimate high net
recreation benefits.4
The reservoir part of the project may
have been the agency’s actual motiva-
tional purpose, but the primary
elements of the project on the record
never required a dam. This is why the
citizen opponents, though consistently
and pointedly ignored by the agency, its
allies, and the national press, could
argue realistically for highly beneficial
non-dam river-based alternative
development plans that would preserve
the endangered darter.
The Fish’s Little T River Habitat
and Its Valley Were Public Treasures.
The flowing Little Tennessee River and
its valley were extraordinary public
resources that would be lost — rich in
agricultural lands, history, and tourism
and sporting potential — offering
broad-based economic opportunities for
the people of East Tennessee and the
nation, as well as the last major natural
habitat of the
endangered little
darter. The
special qualities
of the river —
cool, clear,
highly
oxygenated
water flowing
over broad,
shallow
graveled riffles
— had
preserved the
fish in the Little
T as its similar
habitats
elsewhere were
destroyed one
by one by
dams. Its valley
had been a
treasure for
humans for
more than
10,000 years,
with archaeo-
logical relics beneath more recent
Cherokee sites revealing it as having the
oldest continuous human habitation in
the entire United States. 
In its natural flowing state the river
was used and beloved by thousands. The
river was a major recreational resource
on its own terms, attracting anglers from
all over the Southeast and flotillas of
weekend family float trips even before it
had been rendered a virtually unique
resource by the impoundment of 2,500
linear miles of river in the surrounding
region. The agricultural soils of the valley
were of great economic value, with more
than 15,000 acres of prime-grade
agricultural soils. The valley contained a
dozen Cherokee religious and historical
sites still visited by herb-gathering
medicinemen from the Cherokee, North
Carolina, reservation. The valley’s historic
resources held great public value in their
own right and could be capitalized
monetarily in a tourist-based
development if the valley’s central
portion was not flooded. A major portion
of upriver project lands had particular
potential for use as an access and
spillover management area for tourists
coming to the Great Smoky Mountains
National Park, which attracted more than
10 million visitors a year. 
The Dam Project’s Economic
Merits. The Tellico Dam project was a
mistake from the beginning that never
should have been
started. As the internal
agency files indicate,5
and two comprehensive
and intensive federal
economic reviews
subsequently
demonstrated, the
project was patched
together by the TVA
leadership primarily
with exaggerated
agency claims of
benefits, deflated
estimates of costs, and a
staunch aversion to
consideration of any
alternatives for
development of the
river and its valley without a dam and
reservoir. The Timberlake New Town
idea fell apart when Boeing realized that
Congress would not fund it and the
project made no economic sense on its
own, though TVA remained adamant.
The U.S. GAO did a study of the project
in 1977 that warned that all of TVA’s
benefit-cost figures for the project were
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“The U.S. GAO did a study 
of the project in 1977 that
warned that all of TVA’s
benefit-cost figures for the
project were unreliable. …
After six months of full-dress
inquiry into the merits of the
dam and the darter’s river
valley, the tribunal
unanimously concluded 
that the dam did not make
economic sense even after
almost all the project’s
budget had been spent.” 
unreliable.6 Contrary to its public
image, the dam has no generators and
produces a relatively small amount of
power via canal. After the Supreme
Court decision, under Senator Baker’s
prodding, Congress’s ESA Amendments7
of 1978 sent Tellico into an intensive
economic scrutiny process in the
Cabinet-level God Committee tribunal.
After six months of full-dress inquiry
into the merits of the dam and the
darter’s river valley, the tribunal
unanimously concluded that the dam
did not make economic sense even after
almost all the project’s budget had been
spent. An accurate assessment of TVA’s
design was that from the start the
Tellico Project would lose 76 cents for
every dollar invested.8 Even on purely
economic grounds, as Charles Schulze,
chair of the President’s Council of
Economic Advisors concluded, the total
benefits of the nearly completed project
still did not add up to the mere 5
percent of costs remaining to be spent:
Here is a project that is 95 percent
complete, and if one takes just the
cost of finishing it against the benefits,
and does it properly, it doesn’t pay —
which says something about the
original design! [Laughter.]9
The large majority of project
expenditures were found to have public
value even without completion of the
dam. The darter was found to represent
recreational, touristic, and develop-
mental values including $40 million
worth of prime agricultural lands. The
press, however, largely ignored this
dramatic example of how, far from
hindering economic progress, good
ecology made good economics. 
Economic Environmental
Alternatives to a Tellico Dam. With
increasing sophistication over the years,
the citizen coalition opposing the dam
argued for a comprehensive river-based
development project. The citizens’
alternative river-based development
plans drafted by UT10 were strenuously
ignored by the agency. They would have
allowed the displaced farm families to
go back onto most of the rich
agricultural lands of the valley;
channeled potentially millions of
tourists up a “Cherokee Trail” route
from I-40 and I-75 through the valley
with its Cherokee and archaeological
sites and old Fort Loudon into the
Smokies National Park; developing the
flowing river fishing resource
(Arkansas’s White River recreational
development, with an inferior river,
generates $300 million in annual
economic activity); providing enhanced
locations for light industrial
development; and the like. 
The Law of the Snail Darter.
Without a court injunction, there was
and is no governmental forum
practically accessible to challenge the
dubious economic merits of public
works projects like the Tellico reservoir.
Judges are consistently loathe to
scrutinize the economics of porkbarrel
projects launched and sustained in the
other co-equal branches of
government.11 The farmers’ and
sportsmen’s appeals on the merits to
TVA, Congress, the state and federal
agencies, and the media fell on
unresponsive deaf ears. It is difficult to
get political power establishments to
scrutinize their essential mistakes.
Common sense is not self-executing. 
The citizen plaintiffs’ coalition was a
motley little assemblage of obstinate
farmers, frustrated fishermen, history
buffs, environmental law students and
their untenured professor, and other
volunteers from the community. T-shirt
sales and potluck suppers. Not very
extremist. Under the ESA’s citizen-
enforcement provision — a proud, very
American innovation widespread in
public-interest laws after the ’60s — by
filing a 60-day notice, the darters’
defenders had statutory standing to
enforce the federal law in court against
even a powerful federal agency like TVA.
The legal case began on statutory
terms and ultimately turned on equity
canons. ESA §7 presented two veiled
causes of action: a prohibition against
Continued on page 18
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agencies putting species into jeopardy of
extinction, or destroying critical habitat.
Making the legal case quite easy to
prove, the little endangered species was
intimately linked ecologically to its river
habitat’s special qualities, a habitat that
had been eliminated everywhere else by
2,500 linear river miles of dammed
reservoirs. Thus it operated as a legal
“canary in the coal mine,” a vivid
indicator of the special values of the
river and valley habitat for humans as
well. To change the river into a narrow,
shallow, warm-water lake would
eliminate the darter’s major remaining
population and drown most of the
valley’s most valuable assets under mud
and low-quality algae-laden waters. 
While TVA accelerated its bulldozing
and construction to moot the case, and
tried to block legal enforcement of the
Act, the little citizen coalition, with help
from several citizens groups in
Washington, persuaded the Department
of Interior to list the species and its
Little T habitat as endangered under the
ESA. In court, with the deft efforts of
masterful local litigator Boone
Dougherty, Judge Robert Love Taylor
was forced to find that the dam
jeopardized the
darter and
destroyed its
critical habitat.
Judge Taylor’s
reluctance to enjoin
the ongoing ESA
violation, as an exercise of equitable
forbearance, was corrected by the Sixth
Circuit, and by the Supreme Court after
arguments on Aug. 18, 1978. As Chief
Justice Burger said, a court’s equity
powers could not override statutory
commands. 
The Darter Swims into a National
Political Whirlpool. The federal ESA
injunction effectively created a “remand
to Congress,” triggering prolonged
battles at the national political level. For
the next three years the citizens’ defense
of the darter and its river required a
permanent presence in Washington.12
The snail darter became a pawn on the
national chessboard, focusing the
attention of major political power blocs
and agendas. Larger political forces took
over TVA’s burden. The Tellico
ESA injunction raised the
specter of increased
scrutiny for a host of
other far more
significant porkbarrel realms.
By potentially creating a unique legal
forum for economic scrutiny of projects,
the ESA caused a “Pork Panic.”13 The
water projects establishment — agencies
and tied-in market interests —feared
that revelations about the falsified
economics of Tellico would undermine
far bigger resource projects across the
nation in the public’s eye. 
Most directly, the Tellico precedent
raised reverberating fears in Washington
for the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway,
a $4 billion boondoggle that would
never withstand transparency if ever it
was scrutinized; the “Tenn-Tom”
happened to contain three endangered
fish species. If the ESA prompted people
to inquire into pork-barrel economics,
those projects were in trouble. 
And the darter flushed up even more
potent enemies. Beyond the water
projects establishment were political
allies in other resource establishments
like the Forest Service/timber industry
coalitions, BLM/ranchers and miners,
and the FERC/Edison Electric Institute
establishment.14 These industry lobbies
joined forces to discredit the darter
injunction because the not-coincidental
presence of endangered species conflicts
could potentially bring unwelcome
public scrutiny into such a wide range of
agency-industry projects and programs.
The track of the snail darter case may
even be discernible at the highest macro
level of American politics! In the ’60s the
political blocs of the industrial
establishment and the GOP had been sent
reeling by the twin shocks of the
devastating Goldwater defeat and the
hugely popular anti-Establishment civic
movements culminating with the first
Snail Darter continued from page 17
Earth Day. The “Establishment” and
traditional authority institutions were
being widely regarded with populist
aversion, but they began to fight back in
the later Nixon years. The Powell
Memorandum15 identified a need for “free
market forces” to launch a coordinated
reaction, discrediting and marginalizing
the popular “anti-business” civic
movements — environmentalism,
consumer protection, labor and civil
rights. The snail darter was a god-send,
seized upon as an example that could be
framed as extreme, irrational, leftist,
activism that called into question not only
citizen-based
populism but
meddling govern-
mental civic
regulation in general. As
Sen. Baker’s chief aide and
political agent, Jim Range, perhaps the
single most effective ESA opponent then
on the Hill, lectured me, “Public support
for endangered species is a mile wide these
days … but it’s only an inch deep. If we
can show the public how this kind of
regulation hurts people in the
pocketbook, they’ll turn away 
real quick.”16
It was imperative to cast the darter
case as a joke and prevent public
opinion from seeing the ESA’s economic
merits in the snail darter case. If in this,
supposedly the most extreme environ-
mental case ever, it turned out that the
environmentalists were the ones making
sober economic sense, and the agency
was the miscreant, then the reverber-
ations could be disastrous. If, on the
other hand, the darter case could be
framed as environmental extremism, it
could become a handy wedge tool for
industry and market force lobbyists —
led by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
the National Association of
Manufacturers, and their industry-
funded “Public Interest Law
Foundations”17 — to undercut the ESA
and other environmental regulations
hampering industry, and marginalizing
citizen environmentalists by tagging
them as love-beaded hippies and silly
Grannies. The icon of the extremely
irrational darter could be used to
discredit progressive civic regulations far
beyond environmental issues.
Inside Out: The Darter Icon in the
Press and Politics. Ultimately the pork-
barrel coalition in Congress, with a rider
pushed onto an appropriations bill by
Rep. John Duncan and Sen. Baker,
overturned the ESA’s protections for the
darter,18 and President Jimmy Carter
retreated from his promised veto of the
bill (which also had prohibited
economic analysis of water projects by
the president’s water resources council).
After 200 million years, the
river ended on Dec. 29,
1979.
The critical
failure in the
darter’s final defense
probably lay with the inability
of the citizens to bring public
recognition to the dramatic real
economic merits of the darter’s case and
the dysfunctional economic demerits of
TVA’s dam. Before the rider vote, every
Member of Congress was given a
personal letter from Secretary of Interior
Cecil Andrus, chair of the economic
review ordered by Congress that had
unanimously decided against the dam.
But although every member knew of the
Tellico Dam’s economics, they also knew
that the American public did not know,
so the pork barrel was free to roll. And
the president was told by his political
liaison, Frank Moore, that he could not
withstand the ridicule a veto would
receive from the press and public
opinion that viewed the snail darter as
an economically irrational, environ-
mentally extreme technicality.19
And so it was. With Sen. Baker’s
assistance the congressional pork barrel
was able to roll, and even the president
of the United States was dissuaded from
asserting the economic merits by the
media mockery of the case.
Despite the law and despite the
economic record, in other words, the
Continued on page 20
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darter’s last major natural population and
its river were ultimately lost because their
national political opponents were
successful in framing the case in the
public eye as an icon of foolishness, the
caricature that still continues in press
commentary and political discourse today.
(Fortuitously for the fish, a massive
transplant to two locations and the
discovery of a
small relic
population
in a
downstream
tributary have
reduced the risk of extinction
to the point that the darter is
now listed as “threatened”
rather than “endangered.”20)
How did the public, and thereby
the political process, fail to get the
dramatic essential facts of the darter’s
case? In part it was TVA’s public relations
department, persistently sidestepping
criticism of the dam on its merits, but
continually distributing a flood of press
materials that reinforced the cliché — a
photo-clip handout showing the dam
(photographed with a wide-angle lens to
increase its mass) juxtaposed against a
close-up of a dead little darter lying on a
stiff cold lab table alongside a ruler
calibrating its diminutive size. The dam
was continually represented as a
hydroelectric dynamo, with nary a word
that it was essentially a project for
recreation, and development by private
companies on condemned private
farmlands.
More significantly, the anti-regulatory
industrial community and its talk-radio
adjuncts kept up a drumroll of the silly-
fish-versus-huge-hydroelectric-dam
caricature at the national level, in press
releases, lobbying materials and political
commentary.
And the national media no less than
the local Tennessee press failed to
investigate the dramatic realities of one
of the three most-covered environ-
mental stories of the decade, and so got
it backwards. Why?
In some cases the media’s missing of
the Tellico dam’s faulty merits
undoubtedly reflected political biases in
the press. Local reporters in Tennessee
reported that their editors did not
welcome the idea of investigative stories
about Tellico. One reporter from the
Lenoir City paper confessed to us “I
know a lot about the Tellico project,
and you are right, it’s nuts. But my
publisher won’t let me write a word
about this.” Local stories contin-
uously reflected superficial
reporting on the latest
maneuvers between the
fish and the dam, often
basically reprinting
TVA’s dismissive
press
releases. 
At the
national level, too,
the “liberal media” was strangely inert.
Having solicited coverage from more
than 120 reporters, some of whom I
spoke with more than a dozen times,
we never got a national investigative
story on the real merits of the Tellico
Dam/snail darter conflict. We once
spent half a precious afternoon in
Washington with a Wall Street Journal
reporter. He pored through the maps
and data, obviously taken with the case.
In economic terms, he declared with
surprise, Tellico and its private land
condemnations vividly illustrated the
corruptions of the pork barrel. “So what
will you write about Tellico?” we asked.
He paused, shook his head, and told us
regretfully, “Nothing. It’s against our
editorial policy.” “But you don’t write for
the editorial page. You are a news
reporter!” He sighed and said that was
correct, but the WSJ’s editors didn’t
want to run news stories where environ-
mentalism made economic sense. 
From a different perspective, more
than one “liberal” reporter mentioned to
us that they had been raised on the
progressive New Deal image of TVA
dams bringing social progress to a
benighted region, and were distressed
that the case reflected TVA as a just
another calcified giant utility, albeit
vested with extraordinary governmental
powers over its region.21
And finally there is the fact that the
media’s news departments today are just
another business, selling “infotainment”
to a public deemed incapable of or
uninterested in understanding complex
controversies that cannot be reduced to
jazzy, 10-second sound bites. 
If the press is to be democracy’s
informational lifeline, however, the
failures illustrated by the denouement of
the darter are troubling. “This sort of
thing endangers more than fish.”22 An
important part of lawyering, it appears,
especially public interest lawyering, is
an ability to leverage the merits of the
case into the public consciousness. The
legal process does not exist in an
idealized vacuum sealed off from the
realities of politics and media, and
public interest lawyering skills must be
multiplexed, playing simultaneously in
all the relevant theaters. 
In Sum, to Be Continued …
Looking back after 30 years, we can
celebrate that only in America could a
little group of citizens so lacking in
money and power (and tenure) have
carried such a case to the highest levels
of the society’s governance, digging so
deep into the guarded complexities of
interlocking economic and political
establishments. Today, however, the
Tellico reservoir sits there as just another
TVA lake, with localized development
features falling far below the extraor-
dinary alternative promises presented by
the treasures of the flowing river.23 The
river ultimately was narrowly lost
through an unlaudable insider
maneuver, but as the story gradually
becomes better known, the saga of the
snail darter in law, science, economics,
media process and policy, still evokes
lessons that are worth winnowing in
conversations to come.
ZYGMUNT J. B. PLATER is
a professor at Boston
College Law School. He
received his bachelor’s
degree from Princeton
University; his law degree
Snail Darter continued from page 19
from Yale University; his LL.M. and S.J.D., from
the University of Michigan. Plater is a member
of the bars of Tennessee and the District of
Columbia, and teaches and writes in the fields
of environmental law, property and land use
law, and administrative process, with further
interests in comparative international law and
public interest litigation. He has taught on
seven law faculties, and handled national
endangered species litigation — most
notoriously six years spent on the case of the
endangered snail darter fish vs. TVA’s Tellico
Dam in administrative and congressional
proceedings and federal litigation up through
the U.S. Supreme Court. Plater was chair of the
State of Alaska’s Oilspill Commission Legal
Research Task Force after the stranding of the
M/V Exxon-Valdez, and has been a legal
consultant in many environmental law cases
including the Woburn, Mass., toxic litigation,
Anderson et al. v. W.R. Grace et al., the subject
of the book and movie A Civil Action.
Notes
1. There were more than a dozen judicial
decisions in the course of the TVA campaign to
build the Tellico Dam, including condem-
nation challenges, NEPA litigation, endangered
species litigation and Indian religious rights
cases. See United States ex rel. TVA v. Two Tracts
of Land, 387 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Tenn. 1974)
(condemnation challenge), aff’d, 532 F.2d
1083 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827
(1976); EDF v. TVA (I), 339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D.
Tenn., 1972) (NEPA litigation), aff’d, 468 F.2d
1164 (6th Cir. 1972); EDF v. TVA (II), 371 F.
Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn.) (NEPA litigation),
aff’d, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974); Hill v. TVA,
419 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1976)
(endangered species litigation), rev’d, 549 F.2d
1064 (6th Cir. 1977), aff’d, 437 U.S. 153
(1978); Sequoyah v. TVA, 480 F. Supp. 608
(E.D. Tenn. 1979) (Indian religious rights),
aff’d, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 953 (1980). 
The case was also subject to the first-ever
economic review scrutiny by the Cabinet-level
Endangered Species Committee that
unanimously decided in
favor of the darter on
economic grounds.
U.S. Department of
the Interior, Endangered
Species Committee, Record of
Hearing of Jan. 23, 1979. 
For more details, see Plater, “Reflected in a
River: Agency Accountability and the TVA
Tellico Dam Case,” 49 Tenn. L. Rev. 747 (1982).
For an essay with photo slides on this case, see
http://www.law.mercer.edu/elaw/zygplater.html 
2. In an online poll of environmental law
professors from across the country seeking a
consensus on the 10 most important court
cases in the history of environmental law, TVA
v. Hill received the highest number of votes,
almost twice as many as the two cases that
placed second (Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
and Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). See post
of James Salzman to envlawprofs@
darkwing.uoregon.edu (Oct. 26, 2001) (copy
on file with author). On the other hand, the
snail darter is regularly presented by business
and conservative commentators and lobbyists
as a paradigm of regulatory foolishness and
environmentalists’ extremism: 
America today is a new homosocialism …
What these people are is against private
property rights. They are trying to attack
capitalism and corporate America, … trying
to say that we must preserve … the snail
darter and whatever it is. 
— Rush Limbaugh, The Rush Limbaugh
Show (Dec. 7, 1993).
There were more than a dozen judicial
decisions in the course of the TVA campaign
to build the Tellico Dam, including condem-
nation challenges, NEPA litigation,
endangered species litigation, and Indian
religious rights cases. See United States ex rel.
TVA v. Two Tracts of Land, 387 F. Supp. 319
(E.D. Tenn. 1974) (condemnation challenge),
aff’d, 532 F.2d 1083 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 827 (1976); EDF v. TVA (I), 339 F.
Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn.) (NEPA litigation),
aff’d, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972); EDF v.
TVA (II), 371 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn.)
(NEPA litigation), aff’d, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir.
1974); Hill v. TVA, 419 F. Supp. 753 (E.D.
Tenn. 1976) (endangered species litigation),
rev’d, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977), aff’d,
437 U.S. 153 (1978); Sequoyah v. TVA, 480 F.
Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) (Indian religious
rights), aff’d, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980). 
For fuller background: see Plater, “Reflected
in a River: Agency Accountability and the TVA
Tellico Dam Case,” 49 Tenn. L. Rev. 747 (1982),
and William Bruce Wheeler and Michael J.
McDonald, TVA and the Tellico Dam, 1936-
1979: A Bureaucratic Crisis in Post-Industrial
America (1986). See also Kenneth Murchison,
Continued on page 22
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A Symposium on Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill: A
30-Year Retrospective on the Legendary Snail Darter Case
April 18 at the UT College of Law
Speakers include Dr. David Etnier, the UT professor who discovered the
snail darter; Dr. Jeff Chapman, the director of UT’s McClung Museum and
expert on the archeological treasures of the Little Tennessee River valley;
Tennessee attorneys Hank Hill and Peter Alliman (Hill one of the original
plaintiffs in the case and Alliman a researcher and student activist in the
litigation); Boston College Professor of Law Zygmunt Plater, who argued the
case in the federal agencies, congressional process, and three courts including
the U.S. Supreme Court; UT History Professor Bruce Wheeler who wrote a
book on TVA’s internal perspective on the dam; University of Vermont Professor
of Law Patrick Parenteau, formerly with the National Wildlife Federation and
nationally recognized expert on the Endangered Species Act who aided the
Tennessee citizens in Washington; LSU Law Professor Ken Murchison,
author of The Snail Darter Case — TVA v. the Endangered Species Act;
and landowners from the Valley who were displaced by the
dam. Admission is free. For more information go to
http://www.law.utk.edu/news/08snail.htm
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The Snail Darter Case: TVA versus the ESA
(2007). For an essay with slides on this case,
see http://www.law.mercer.edu/elaw/
zygplater.html 
3. The caricature’s inaccuracies: The project’s
official design was primarily as a recreation and
shoreland redevelopment project; the concrete
dam itself cost only about $5 million, and most
of the $150+m. project costs were for land
purchase and the cost of useful new
infrastructure, roads, bridges, etc.; the project
was ultimately found to have been diseconomic
from the beginning; the case was brought, not
by extremists, but by a coalition of farmers,
fishermen, history buffs, and environmentalists
making the conservative argument that river-
based developments were economically
preferable; the citizen efforts to enforce the
federal Endangered Species Act began over
TVA’s protests in 1974, long before most of the
project expenditures were made; and finally the
fish (Percina imostoma tanasi) is a perch, not a
minnow, and fully 21/2 inches long when
mature, not just 2 inches. “This is the only fish
story I know of,” said Secretary of Interior Cecil
Andrus, “where the fish keeps getting smaller!”
4. See Murchison, at 16-18. TVA
condemned more than 38,000 acres of private
land for Tellico, of which slightly more than
10,000 acres was for reservoir purposes. Land
redevelopment and recreation benefit claims
together created almost 60 percent of annual
claimed benefits; more traditional hydro
benefits comprised the rest (see TVA, Tellico
Dam Project EIS I-1-49 (1972)), though the
subsequent economic reviews denied those as
well. See Comptroller-General of the United
States, “Report to the Congress: The TVA’s
Tellico Dam Project — Costs, Alternatives, and
Benefits,” EMD-77-58 (Oct. 14, 1977).
Federal construction projects require
affirmative benefit-cost justifications, at that
time under the terms of Senate Document No.
97, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). The
appropriations committees could not release
public funding without an affirmative B-C
ratio, which understandably encouraged
inventive agency economic projections.
The Model City idea was copied from plans
by Athelstan Spilhaus for a new town in
Minnesota, also deemed impractical and never
built. See TVA, “Tennessee Valley Authority
Environmental Statement: Timberlake New
Community” (1976). Swatara, Minnesota, also
considered building a Spilhaus utopia in the form
of a 20,000-acre domed city, which, after approx-
imately $1.5 million in private and public money
spent on planning throughout the 1960s and
early 1970s, was finally defeated in the 1973
Minnesota legislature due to stiff opposition and
budgetary constraints. See “Once a Dead and
Buried Idea ...,” Chicago Tribune, Jan. 27, 1987, at
3C. TVA planners named the hypothetical city
“Timberlake” after Lt. Henry Timberlake of
George III’s colonial army who visited the valley
and produced the first map of the area in 1762.
See also William Bruce Wheeler and Michael J.
McDonald, TVA and the Tellico Dam, 1936-1979: A
Bureaucratic Crisis in Post-Industrial America, 3-33
(1986), at 169, 182.
5. See William Bruce Wheeler and Michael
J. McDonald, TVA and the Tellico Dam, 1936-
1979: A Bureaucratic Crisis in Post-Industrial
America , 3-33 (1986).
6. Comptroller Gen. of the U.S., “The
Tennessee Valley Authority’s Tellico Dam Project
— Costs, Alternatives, and Benefits” (1977).
7. Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751
(1978). On the Baker-Culver ESA Amendments
of 1978, see Murchison at pp. 151-154.
8. The federal interagency economic review
was led by Robert K. Davis, an emeritus
economist at the University of Colorado, who
has published extensively on the flawed
economic processes of public works projects. 
9. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Endangered
Species Committee Hearing 26 (Jan. 23,
1979), at pp. 25-26, Statement of Charles
Schultze, Chairman of the President’s Council
of Economic Advisors. [emphasis added]
10. The citizens’ proposals for alternative
development were embodied in a study
prepared by the University of Tennessee
School of Architecture and by the God
Committee staff. School of Architecture,
University of Tenn., “Study of Alternative
Futures for the Little Tennessee River Valley”
(1977); see also TVA, “Alternatives for
Completing the Tellico Project” (Dec. 1978);
Office of Policy Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of the
Interior, Tellico Dam and Reservoir (Jan. 19,
1979) (Staff Report to the Endangered Species
Committee). The National Park Service also
recommended the river development
alternative over the reservoir plan as being
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developments in that area, but for
now, we can take much comfort, and
do much good planning, from the law
we have.
DAN W. HOLBROOK practices estate law with
Holbrook, Peterson & Smith PLLC in Knoxville.
He is certified as an estate planning specialist
by the Tennessee Commission on Continuing
Legal Education and Specialization, is a fellow
of the American College of Trust and Estate
Counsel, and serves on the TBA Probate Study
Group reviewing and recommending
legislation involving trusts and estates in
Tennessee. He can be reached at dholbrook@
hpestatelaw.com.
Notes
1. Briefly, a VDC is useful when an
irresistible force (i.e., a transfer of wealth,
especially when difficult to value, such as a
family limited partnership), encounters an
immovable object (i.e., a fixed exemption or
exclusion such as the annual gift tax exclusion
or the federal estate tax exemption). The best
known example is a marital deduction formula
clause under a will, which allocates a fixed
dollar amount to family and the balance to a
marital share. A VDC, which can be either inter
vivos or testamentary, can either (1) simply
allocate a fixed dollar amount to family; or (2)
allocate a fixed dollar amount to family and the
balance to another entity that causes no further
gift or estate taxation, such as spouse outright,
marital trust, charity, “zeroed-out” Grantor
Retained Annuity Trust (GRAT), or “zeroed-out”
Charitable Lead Annuity Trust (CLAT).
2. McCord v. Comm., 461 F.3rd 614 (5th
Cir. 2006), revg. 120 T.C. No. 358 (2003).
3. Estate of Christiansen, 130 T.C. No. 1
(2008).
4. I say “properly prepared” VDCs because
the IRS still can, and no doubt will, attack such
clauses that are not within the guidelines set out
in McCord and Christiansen. And I say “most”
VDCs because even some formula clauses
within the spirit of McCord and Christiansen
might have unusual facts that give pause.
5. The facts as stated are oversimplified.
The will provided that 75 percent of any
portion disclaimed would pass to a Charitable
Lead Annuity Trust (CLAT) and only 25
percent would pass to the foundation. A
substantial portion of the opinion (and the
primary issue for which this case was
discussed in the media) involved whether or
not the amount passing to the CLAT would
qualify for any charitable deduction (it did
not), but that portion of the opinion is
irrelevant for this purpose. The much broader
issue was whether or not the 25 percent
portion passing outright to charity would
qualify for estate tax charitable deduction, to
the full extent of the increase in estate value
upon IRS audit and settlement (it did).
Value Definition Clauses continued from page 37
better suited for easing the park’s crowding
and traffic flow problems. Senate Endangered
Species Act Oversight: “Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Resource Protection of the
Senate Comm. on Environment and Public
Works,” 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 291 (1977)
(testimony of Park Superintendent Boyd
Evison). Surprisingly, in spite of the citizens’
continued arguments and the economics of the
situation, neither the TVA nor God Committee
official reports considered what was the most
profitable element of the river development
option — tourism. Archeological treasures,
historical sites, and the Great Smoky
Mountains National Park offered a unique
opportunity for a tourist industry to flourish
along the existing river.
11. The NEPA cases have consistently
demonstrated the judicial reluctance to pry
into the accuracy of public works projects.
12. The author, thanks to an understanding
dean in his new academic position in
Michigan, was able to spend 21/2 days of every
week, working out of donated space in
national citizen groups’ offices — special
honor to Friends of the Earth, Sierra Club,
National Wildlife Federation, American Rivers
— and sleeping on couches and guest beds
volunteered by NGO activists in the capital.
13. Ward Sinclair, “‘Pork Panic’ Sweeping
Congress in Wake of Darter’s Rescue,” The
Washington Post, June 28, 1978 at A2.
14. These political establishments form
“Iron Triangles,” as the political scientists call
them: political bonds between the agencies that
get taxpayer dollars, the private market forces
that build the programs and projects, and the
congressional blocs that deliver the money in
return for power and campaign finance.
15. The Powell Memorandum was
prepared by Lewis Powell for the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce shortly before he
went onto the Supreme Court. In it he
decried the creeping socialism dominating
America, as exemplified by civil rights,
consumerism, and environmentalism, and he
called for business to begin funding academic
and representational programs and
foundations to counteract the 1960s
ideologies in American society. The
memorandum led directly to the founding of
the Heritage Foundation and other similar
initiatives. See Lewis F. Powell Jr.,
“Confidential Memorandum: Attack on
American Free Enterprise System” (Aug.
23, 1971).
16. Conversation with Jim Range, Fall,
1978, during hearings on Baker-Culver bill,
paraphrased.
17. See Oliver Houck, “With Charity for
All,” 93 Yale L.J. 1415 (1984) (analyzing how
industry has created and financed “public
interest law firms” as “charitable organizations”
to promote business interests against govern-
mental regulation in the public interest).
18. See Murchison at pp. 165, 180.
19. When he called me the evening of the
non-veto, apparently seeking absolution, the
president indicated that the appropriations
committee was able to mobilize too much
political force against the darter, despite the
actual merits of the economic record.
20. See 49 Fed. Reg. 27,510 (Aug. 6, 1984)
(codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1985)). Does the
darter’s currently stabilized survival generally
undercut arguments for species protection, or
mean that the citizens’ litigation seeking to save
its last major natural population was a mistake?
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